The fear of a Russian attack in Lithuania: ‘The threat is real. We know that from our history’

No, it cannot. I was talking about the strategic importance of the Suwalki Gap though. Russian aggression is not overblown whatsoever.

>This is a little overblown.

If the US helps, then I would agree.

But can that *really* be counted on now?

That is the problem with transitioning your government into a war time economy, once it starts sustaining itself it's nearly impossible to decouple from without initiating a huge recession.

It's the reason Putin is treating peace negotiations as a joke, there is no economic incentive for peace. Most foreign capital left Russia after the war in Georgia in 08, and the rest left or were gobbled up by the state after the war in Ukraine.

If the Russian government doesn't sustain a war in Ukraine or start another war relatively soon their economy will soon spiral out of control. The Guns vs Butter model is still a *removed* to deal with, and Russia as a nation throughout history seems to be incapable of learning that particular lesson.

One can only hope that Western Europe sees Russia for the threat it is.

>This is the Suwałki Gap, described as “most dangerous place in the world”.

>This narrow strip of land, just 65 kilometres long, connects the Baltic states with Poland and thus also with the other NATO countries. To the west of it lies the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, to the east, Moscow-loyal Belarus. If Putin were to strike here, it would be relatively easy for him to cut the Baltic states off from their allies.

This is a little overblown.

The plan was never to try to dig in and hold the borders of the Baltics, that's not feasible. They're just too small, there isn't enough depth. In any kind of large war, they would almost certainly be occupied, at least mostly. The question is, for how long, and how painful and resource-intensive would the process be for Russia? Once NATO mobilized, there would be a significant counterattack coming from the west. The Baltics wouldn't be that much easier to hold for Russia, being in range of naval power and such a ridiculous number of NATO airbases.

That said, this is why a full scale attack is unlikely, at least at first. Putin knows a massive invasion, like what Ukraine faced, would bring almost all of Europe into a war with him in a completely unwinnable situation. Instead, it's much more likely for him to try incremental escalations, testing Article 5 with small scale incursions and attacks, hoping he can drive wedges between the alliance members while leaning on nuclear saber rattling to deter a large retaliation. Ideally, NATO retains the ability to retaliate in kind to avoid escalation. While they don't have as many undersea cables as we have, there are multiple other avenues for delivering smaller-scale retributions. Cyber, sabotage, diplomatic/legal, economic, etc.

Where is .ml?